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On the determinants of the degree of openness of Open Source firms: 








This paper examines the relationship between the degree of openness that software start-ups choose and some of the 
main industrial features faced by new entrants. Hypotheses derived from a formal model are tested through the 
implementation of econometric techniques and information provided by a novel database (ELISS). Theoretical 
predictions and empirical results indicate that the choice by start-ups of the degree of openness is negatively influenced 
by the sensitivity of consumers to price and is positively related both to the strength of network externalities their 
products exhibit and to the competitive advantage of the incumbent. 
 
Keywords: open-source software; network effects; entry 
JEL codes: L13; L17; L86; 014 
 
1. Introduction  
Even though Open Source (OS) was born as an ideological oriented-movement, it is now rapidly 
transforming into a valuable business opportunity for software firms, which, in various ways, are 
taking advantage from the code and knowledge produced by communities of OS developers 
(Fitzgerald, 2006).  
An increasing body of literature is addressing commercial companies’ involvement in the OS arena. 
Specifically, economic and managerial scholars have extensively explored: (i) business models built 
up to profit from the open code freely downloadable from the Web (Krishnamurthy, 2003; West, 
2007); (ii) entrepreneurial processes activated out of successful OS programs (Gruber and Henkel, 
2006; Dahlander, 2007); and (iii) firms’ relationships with OS communities (Dahlander and Wallin, 
2006, Dahlander and Magnusson, 2008). As far this latter aspect, researchers have focused, in 
particular, on companies’ decision of revelling/not revelling their code back to OS developers 
(Henkel, 2006) and on firms’ active participation in OS community projects (Capra et al., 2009; 
Gosh et al., 2008; Lerner and Tirole, 2006).  
In general, most of these works have adopted a descriptive approach, aiming at documenting, with 
rich and detailed qualitative and quantitative evidence, the puzzling phenomenon of for-profit 
agents’ participation in the private provision of a collective good (Johnson, 2005). Whereas, up to 
now, the theorising effort on the intriguing research questions posed by firms doing business out of 
Open Source have turned up to be unsatisfactory and several authors (Dalle et al., 2008; von Krogh 
et al., 2009) have pointed to the need of grounding the phenomenon in the mainstream economics 
and managerial discourse. 
This paper aims at contributing in this direction by providing a theoretical model predicting the 
choice of the degree of openness by software start-up companies doing business out of OS and 
testing it on a dataset drawn from a large-scale survey taken, in 2004, on software firms in five 
European countries (Finland, Germany, Italy, Portugal, and Spain). 
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In particular, following Bonaccorsi et al. (2006), we label as OS firms those companies providing 
solutions based on software produced by OS communities to their customers, either exclusively or 
in conjunction with proprietary products and services (hybrid firms). More specifically, we develop 
an entry model a là Armstrong and Vickers (1993) and test various hypotheses on the optimal  
degree of openness that software start-ups will choose depending on the characteristics of markets, 
products and consumers they deal with.  
Degree of openness is computed as the weight of the OS offering over the total firm’s offering, as 
measured by the share of the turnover generated by the provision of OS solutions. The choice by 
start-ups of the degree of openness is posed in relation with the characteristics of the demand faced 
by companies (i.e. the sensitivity of consumers to price), the strength of the network externalities 
that their software products exhibit and, finally, the competitiveness of the market segments in 
which companies operate (i.e. the presence of a large incumbent in these segments).  
In this respect, we extend previous contributions on the topic, thus adding to the current academic 
debate, in several respects.  
As Casadesus-Masanell and Ghemawat (2006), we acknowledge the role of network externalities in 
shaping competition between OS and proprietary software. However, their contribution focuses on 
the interactions between a proprietary incumbent and a community producing open code, setting 
aside traditional competition among firms on the market. Moreover, no elements related to price 
competition (e.g. authors claim that the price of the OS product is zero) or to characteristics of 
market segments in which companies operate are included. At the same time, theoretical predictions 
are not tested through empirical data. Conversely, testing on determinants of firms’ degree of 
openness is included in the work of Bonaccorsi et al. (2006), but, on the one hand, they do not 
provide a theoretical model on which to ground their econometric analysis; on the other hand, they 
focus mainly on the impact on the degree of openness of firms’ structural characteristics and 
relationships with OS communities, setting the influence of the external environment in which 
companies are embedded aside.  
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first contribution in the industrial organization stream of 
literature that aims at investigating, both theoretically and empirically, the impact of market, 
consumers, product characteristics on the degree of openness chosen by start-ups entering the 
software industry. In so doing, our model is not meant to supply a literal representation of the 
choice of the degree of openness by OS firms, which is related to a plethora of company-specific 
and idiosyncratic motives, but, instead to provide a stripped-down theoretical structure for weighing 
various claims about the competition between OS and proprietary mode of producing software.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we formalize an entry model in a 
context characterized by network externalities, we predict how the optimal choice of the degree of 
openness chosen by entrants varies along with the investigated dimensions, and develop the 
theoretical hypotheses to be tested through the econometric analysis. In Section 3, we illustrate our 
sample and provide some descriptive statistics on degree of openness chosen by software start-ups, 
focusing also on demand characteristics and the structure of the market segments in which firms 
compete. In Section 4, we specify the econometric model and describe the variables used in the 
analysis. Section 5 is devoted to the illustration of the results of the econometric estimates, while 
some summarizing remarks in section 6 conclude the paper. 
 
2. The model 
In this section we develop a simple entry model in the spirit of Armstrong and Vickers (1993), in 
which a new entrant firm faces a well-established incumbent in a framework characterized by 
network externalities.    3
Let suppose that there are two firms, firm I (incumbent) and firm E (entrant), each offering a bundle 
of goods (for example, a software package). The goods composing the package cannot be sold 
separately, so both firms adopt a tying rather than a bundling commercial strategy. Firm I sells all 
goods composing the package in “proprietary” (P) format, while firm E may decide to offer some 
goods of the package in an “open source” (OS) format. There are two periods: period 1 (current 
period) and period 2 (future period). At period 1 firm E enters and decides the degree of openness, 
i.e. how many goods in the package shall be offered in the OS format. Firm I observes the degree of 
openness and sets the price.  
We follow Armstrong and Vickers (1993) and we assume that the entrant is price taker. The market 
is characterized by network externalities. Following Casadesus-Masanell and Ghemawat (2006) and 
Jing (2007) network externalities imply that demand of each firm in each period is positively 
affected by the cumulative market share (or installed base). Since firm E enters at period 1, the 
installed base of firm E at period 1 is zero, while the incumbent, which was in the market before 
period 1, owns a positive installed base. Allegedly, the demand functions of firm I and firm E at 
period 1 are given respectively by: 
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where  0    indicates the competitive advantage of firm I over firm E,  0  e  indicates the network 
externalities, and  0  b  indicates the installed base at period 1. Moreover, define  o y W   , where 
y measures the “incumbency advantage” (different from the installed base effect) of firm I and o is 
the degree of openness chosen by firm E
1.   
Assume:  0
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The first inequality is obvious and needs no explanation: parameter   indicates the price sensitivity 
of the demand. The second inequality states that, ceteris paribus, the demand of I increases with the 
competitive advantage of firm I  over firm E. The third inequality states that the competitive 
advantage of I increases with b: due to the existence of positive network externalities, the higher is 
the cumulative market share of firm I when firm E enters, the more firm I is advantaged (i.e. ceteris 
paribus, more consumers buy from it rather than E). The fourth inequality is the counterpart of the 
third inequality: due to the existence of a positive installed base of firm I, the higher are the 
externalities, the more firm I is advantaged from having a positive installed base. The fifth 
inequality states that the competitive advantage of I depends positively on W: that is, the 
competitive advantage of I depends positively on the incumbency advantage, y, and negatively on 
the degree of openness, o. The sixth inequality follows Armstrong and Vickers (1993), and 
characterizes firm E’ demand as a residual demand.  
The fifth and the sixth inequality together imply that demand of firm E increases with the degree of 
openness, while demand of firm I decreases with the degree of openness. This, of course, is not a 
general assumption. It may be that consumers, on average, dislike OS-format: in this case, a 
positive degree of openness would reduce firm E demand and would increase firm I demand. 
                                                 
1 Parameter y has a quite general interpretation. For example, advertisement expenditures by the incumbent affect the 
“incumbency advantage”; similarly, high perceived quality of the incumbent’s product positively reflects on the 
“incumbency advantage”.   4
However, software markets (specifically those considered by us) are usually characterized by a 
general appraisal of consumers towards OS format (certainly consumers who exhibit an aprioristic 
dislike represent a minority), as can be inferred, for example, by the huge development of “open 
source communities” and the widespread diffusion of “free software”. Therefore, a firm which 
matches the consensus surrounding open source philosophy by offering some of its product in OS 
shall be likely to increase its demand to detriment of the firm which is fixed to proprietary format. 
Define: ) ( * 1 2 e g Q Q
I I    , where  ) (e g  is a strictly-increasing function of e. Function  ) (e g  captures 
the idea that the higher are the externalities, the more period 1 demand positively affects period 2 
demand. Finally, in order to keep tractability, the following assumptions on the parameters of the 






























































Define with  * 2
I q  and  * 2
I p  respectively the equilibrium demand and the equilibrium price of firm I 
in period 2. When firm I sets the price in period 1, it anticipates that, due to the existence of 
network externalities, both  * 2
I q  and  * 2
I p  shall depend on the quantity sold at time 1. Therefore, in 
period 1 firm I maximizes the following function: 
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where ) 1 , 0 (    is the discount factor. By taking the derivative of (1) with respect to 
I p1 , we get the 
first order condition for the maximization problem
2: 
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From condition (2) we derive the impact of each variable on the equilibrium price set by firm I. 
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2 It can be easily checked that the second-order condition is satisfied.    5
 
Conjecture for the moment that  0 * 2    
I p  (we check later that this conjecture is indeed correct) 
and assume that the second derivatives are negligible in dimension.
3 When externalities are 







 is positive, while the reverse is true 
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. Hence, we can state the following result:  
 
The incumbent’s first-period equilibrium price increases with the competitive 
advantage when externalities are low, while it decreases when externalities are high.  
 
The intuition of the result is the following. When the competitive advantage of firm I increases 
there are two effects at work: a direct effect and an indirect effect. Higher   implies that firm I can 
set a higher price today and in the future (direct effect). However, the higher price in the current 
period reduces the current demand, and, via externalities, it reduces also the future demand (indirect 
effect). When externalities are particularly high, the indirect effect dominates, and the impact of   
on the equilibrium price at time 1 is negative.  
Turn now to the conjecture  0 * 2    
I p . Since in period 2 there is no future left, firm I has no 
incentive to decrease its price when   increases in order to exploit higher future demand. That is, 
no indirect effect arises. It follows that, in equilibrium, the price in period 2 must increase with the 
competitive advantage. Therefore, conjecture  0 * 2    
I p  is correct.  
Now, note that, since   is a positive function of W, e and b, the impact of these variables on  * 1
I p  is 
also positive when externalities are low and is negative when externalities are high. However, while 
the threshold value of the externalities in the case of b and W continues to be e*, the threshold value 
in case of e, due to the component g(e), may be different from e*. In fact, by taking the derivative of 
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Therefore, the threshold value for the impact of e on the equilibrium price set by firm I in period 1 










. Assume for the moment that  * ˆ e e  . We will turn later to the 
case  * ˆ e e  . Finally, note that higher   implies a lower price in both periods.  
 
The equilibrium demand of firm I at period 1 is: 
 
                                                 
3 Note that this is always true with linear demand functions.   6
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Assumptions b) – c) allow us to write: 
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4. Firm E faces the following profit function: 
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What does firm E choose? By choosing the degree of openness, firm E is able to alter the 
competitive advantage of firm I. Therefore, firm E maximizes 
E   with respect to W
5. The first 
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Consider first  * e e  . Due to assumption a), equation (5) is always negative
6. Therefore: 
 W W min *  where  W  is the set of all possible Ws. 
 
Suppose now  * e e  . The first and the third term in (5) are negative, while the third and the fourth 






 exists. The second order condition 
(disregarding the cross-derivatives) is: 
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Since all terms in (6) are negative, W* is a maximum. Let consider the derivative of (5) with respect 
to e (disregarding the cross-derivatives). We get: 
                                                 
4 Additionally, it can be easily shown that  0 * 1    
I Q . In fact, by taking the derivative of equation (2) with respect to 
 one gets:  0 )) , ( ( * ) ( 2   W eb p e g
I   . It follows  0 * 1    
I p , which yields  0 * 1    
I Q . The intuition is 
straightforward. The higher is the weight attached to the future (i.e. the higher is  ), the higher is the incentive to keep 
the price low today in order to expand the current demand and, via externalities, the future demand.  
5 Clearly, choosing the optimal W coincides with choosing the optimal degree of openness, o, once that the incumbency 
advantage, y, is exogenous.  
6 If assumption a) – which amounts to require that the discount factor is not too high – does not hold, equation (5) may 
be positive or negative. More importantly, the satisfaction of the second order condition would require further 
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Note that all terms in (7) are negative. Therefore, 0 *    e W .                                                                                
 
Let consider now the derivative of (5) with respect to : 
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Note that all terms in (8) are positive. Therefore, 0 *     W .                                                                                
 
Recalling that W depends negatively on the degree of openness, we can summarize the results in the 
following proposition: 
 
When  * e e  , the entrant chooses the maximum degree of openness. When  * e e  , the 
equilibrium degree of openness increases with the externalities and in the competitive 
advantage of the incumbent, while it decreases in the price sensitivity. 
 
The intuition of the proposition can be obtained by looking at Figure 1. When  * e e  , higher degree 
of openness increases the demand of firm E but lowers the price set by firm I. Define with D the 
“demand” curve, i.e. the curve describing the effect of o on firm E’ demand, and with P the “price” 
curve, i.e. the curve describing the effect of o on firm I’ price. Suppose that optimal balancing 
between demand and price implies that the demand is equal to d and the price is equal to p, i.e. the 
distance between the D-curve and the P-curve is  p d H   . The equilibrium degree of openness is 
therefore o*. Suppose now that the externalities or the competitive advantage increase. Ceteris 
paribus, the higher is e or   the lower is the demand of firm E and the higher is the price set by 
firm I. The D-curve shifts downward and the P-curve shifts upward. In order to maintain the same 
H-distance between D and P, the new equilibrium degree of openness, o*’, must be located at the 
right of o*. With regard to the price sensitivity the opposite reasoning holds. Instead, when  * e e  , 
firm E sets the highest possible o, since o increases both the demand of firm E and the price set by 
firm I. 
Suppose now that  * ˆ e e  . Equation (7) has an ambiguous sign when:  *] , ˆ min[ *] , ˆ max[ e e e e e   . 
However, when  *] , ˆ min[ e e e   equation (7) is unambiguously negative. Therefore, for sufficiently 
low externalities, equilibrium degree of openness increases with externalities. Finally, when 
*] , ˆ max[ e e e   firm E chooses the maximum degree of openness. 
Basing on the proposition of our theoretical model, we put forward the following hypotheses to be 
tested through econometric models. 
H1: with all else been equal, the degree of openness chosen by the entrant firm will increase with 
the consumers’ sensitivity to network externalities.   8
H2: will all else been equal, the degree of openness chosen by the entrant firm will increase with 
the competitive advantages of the incumbent on the market in which the firm operates. 
H3: will all else been equal, the degree of openness chosen by the entrant firm will decrease with 
consumers’ sensitivity to price. 
Figure 1 
 
3. Data  
3.1 Sample 
Our empirical analysis relies on the ELISS database, developed by the Laboratory of Economics 
and Management at Sant’Anna School of Advanced Studies
7 within the PRIME Network of 
Excellence
8, founded by European Community within the Sixth Framework Program. 
ELISS provides information on attitudes towards Open Source and its communities of software 
companies (NACE code 72, computer and related activities) in five European countries (Finland, 
Germany, Italy, Portugal, and Spain). A structured questionnaire was administered to partners and 
system administrators of a sample of software companies selected through  a random sampling 
procedure stratified according to size and regions (NUTS2 level). Respondents’ orientation towards 
OS was not known in advance. The questionnaire benefited from a long preparatory phase: it was 
discussed in depth with practitioners (pilot testing) and pre-tested on 40 Spanish and 60 Italian 
firms. It was administered by phone, e-mail and through a dedicated Web site. The total number of 
respondents was 918 (response rate around 17%). Data refer to 2004. To the best of our knowledge, 
there is no alternative published large-scale survey investigating in depth software firms’ attitudes 
towards OS at an international level.  
The first section of the ELISS questionnaire provided detailed information of firms’ structural 
characteristics (i.e. year of foundation, ownership structure, number of funders, size, educational 
level of the employees, typology of customers). The second section comprises questions concerning 
the attitudes towards the OS movement, including the offering of OS-based products and services, 
the share of the turnover generated by the provision of OS solutions, the categories of products 
supplied (both in OS and under proprietary licenses), the motivations of engaging/not engaging in 
OS activities, the OS innovation strategies, and the participation to OS community projects. 
Questions dealing with the characteristics of the demand faced and the products offered by the firm, 
namely consumers’ sensitivity to network externalities and price, were also included.  
Answers to the questionnaire were checked for internal coherence by educated personnel, and, in 
several cases, phone or face-to-face follow up interviews were made with firms’ owner-managers in 
order to obtain missing information and ensure that data were reliable.  
                                                 
7 http://www.sssup.it. 
8 http://www.prime-noe.org/.   9
In this paper, we consider a sample extracted from the ELISS database and composed of all 
software firms satisfying the following conditions: (i) were founded after 2000; (ii) have no missing 
data in the variables we wish to include in the analysis. As far as the former condition, this extracts 
from the database only those firms which are still in a start-up phase and allegedly can be deemed 
as early entrants. In fact, on an empirical ground, it is difficult to define unambiguously when the 
entrant firm that founders have in mind actually materialize since time is needed to hire personnel 
and organize operations at the desired scale (for the same argument see Colombo et al. 2004). In 
this respect we adopted a conservative criterion including in the sample all the firms aged four years 
or less, controlling for their ages in the specification of the econometric model (see infra). The final 
sample was thus composed by 150 firms.
9  
The sample includes both firms working only with proprietary software (proprietary firms: 46 out 
of 150, 30.46%) and companies doing business out of Open Source (OS firms: 104 out of 150, 
69.33%). Following Bonaccorsi et al. 2006, we define OS firms those companies that supply, in 
various ways, OS-based products and services to their customers. It is worth noting that a firm is 
labelled as OS even if its product portfolio includes proprietary solutions (hybrid firms: 75 out of 
104, 73.08%). The degree of openness of firms working only with proprietary software is, by 
definition, zero.  
The large majority of the sample firms (91.22%) are independent so as in 2004 (i.e. they are not 
controlled by another business organisation even though other organisations may hold minority 
shareholdings in them). Table 1 reports their country and size characteristics. 
Table 1: Country and size distribution of sample firms 
   SIZE
 a 
COUNTRY  No. of firms  Obs.  Min.  Max  Mean  Std. Dev.  p50  p75  p95 
Anova F-test 
p-value 
Finland 25  25  1  44  11.08  8.89  9  14  23 
Germany 9  9  9  99  38.00  29.09  28  50  99 
Italy 58  58  1  230  13.03  31.68  5  9  49 
Portugal 17  17  1  12  5.82  3.19  6  7  12 
Spain 41  41  1  1200  64.19  208.09  10  21  110 
Total  150  150  - - -  -  - - - 
0.001 
a An  outlier value has been detected in the variable SIZE and excluded from the analysis. 
 
The size distributions of the firms in the sample, as measured by the sum of working partners, 
employees, and freelances, differs across countries (Anova F-test, p-value=0.001) and reflect those 
of companies in the software sector at the national level (see table A1 in the Appendix). German 
and Spanish software start-ups are, in general, larger than those from other countries. 36.59% of 
Spanish firms have a staff including less than 10 persons, versus 60.00%, 75.86%, and 88.24% for 
Finland, Italy and Portugal respectively (only one German firm out of nine hires less than 10 
employees). At the same time, only 2 Spanish companies hire more than 500 employees. Finnish 
and Portuguese firms are by far the smallest on average.  
Table 2 shows some descriptive statistics on firms’ structural characteristics. Cross-country 
differences emerge with respect to year of foundation (Kruskal Wallis test, p value = 0.0166), share 
of graduate personnel (p value = 0.001), while no difference emerges as far as customers served by 
the firms (Chi square test, p value = 0.127).  
 
                                                 
9 Two respondents satisfying both condition (i) and (ii), but presenting some unreliable figures, were excluded from the 
analysis. Note also a Chi square test shows that there are no statistically significant differences between the distributions 
of the sample firms across countries and the corresponding distributions of the population of the 918 ELISS companies 
from which the sample was obtained. 
   10
Table 2: Structural characteristics of sample firms 
  YEAR OF FOUNDATION  SKILLS
a  MAIN CUSTOMERS 
COUNTRY 





Obs. Mean Std.  Dev. Anova 
F-test  Obs. SMEs Large 
Firms  Univ.  Public 
sector 
End 






Finland  25  2000 2004 2001 2003 2004  22  0.27  0..25  24  50..00 37.50  0.00  8.33  4.17  0.00 
Germany  9  2000 2001 2000 2001 2001  6  0.31  0.26  9  33.33 33.33  0.00 11.-11 22.22  0.00 
Italy  58  2000 2003 2001 2001 2003  57  0.46  0.33  58  56.90 20.69  5.17  13.79  1.72  1.72 
Portugal  17  2001 2004 2001 2004 2004  17  0.39  0.34  17  76.47  0.00  17.65  5.88  0.00  0.00 
Spain  41  2000 2003 2002 2003 2003 
0.016 
36 0.86  0.29 
0.001 
41 53.66  17.07  0  21.96 2.44 4.88 
0.127 
Total  150 2000  2004  2001  2002  2004    138 0.52  0.37    149 55.70 22.82 2.01 14..09 3.36  2.01   
a The variable SKILLS  refers to the share of graduate personnel  
 
In all countries, companies count a relevant share of graduate personnel, this reaches more than 
80% of total staff in the case of Spain.  
Software start-ups in our sample serve mainly business customers, particularly SMEs, while, in 
general, very few refer to University or end users. Indeed, in general, targeting end users requires 
highly standardised software products, whose fixed costs of development are amortizable only 
through large volumes of sales. 
 
3.2 OS offering: the degree of openness of sample firms 
This section has illustrative purposes. We use information on the 150 ELISS sample start-ups to 
provide a description of the activities of the companies with Open Source software, focusing, in 
particular, on their degree of openness. As we cited earlier, 104 out of sample firms (69.33%) 
claimed to provide OS-based solutions to their customers. This figure is in line with the literature 
(see, for instance. Bonaccorsi et al., 2006; Dahlander and Magnusson, 2008) highlighting that an 
increasing number of companies, including not only incumbents, but also new entrants enterprises, 
have entered the OS arena in recent years.  
We measure the degree of openness, which will be used as dependent variable in our econometric 
specification, as the share of turnover generated by the provision of the OS solutions over the total 
turnover, as in 2003. It worth noting that, according to this definition, while proprietary firms have, 
by definition, a degree of openness equal to zero, the degree of openness of OS firms is not 
necessary different from zero. Indeed, their activities with OS may have not generate sales in 2004. 
This happens in 12 cases out of 104 (11.54%). The choice of measuring degree of openness by the 
share of turnover generated by OS products allows us to disentangle truly and effective OS business 
models from merely on chart OS strategies. 
Table 3 reports the distribution of the degree of openness by country. Cross-country difference 
emerge (Chi Square test, p value=0.009), with Italian and Spanish companies showing, in general, 
higher values of the degree of openness.  
Table 3: Distribution of the degree of openness by country 
 Obs.  0%  <10%  10%-30%  31%-50% 51%-70%  71%-90%  91%-99%  100% 
    N % N % N % N % N %  N  % N % N % 
Country                      
Finland 25  11 44.00  2  8.00  3  12.00 1  4.00 4 16.00 1  4.00 2 8.00 1 4.00 
Germany  9  8  88.89  0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00  0  0.00 0 0.00  0  0.00  0  0.00 
Italy 58  9  15.52  8  13.79 11 18.97 4  6.90 5  8.62  9  15.52 6 10.34 6 10.34
Portugal  17 12 70.59  0 0.00 1 5.88 1 5.88 2 11.76 0.00 0.00 0 0.00 1 5.88 
Spain  41 18 43.90  2 4.88 4 9.76 2 4.88  4  7.32 0 0.00  7  17.07 5  12.20
Total  150 58 38.67  12 8.00 19 12.67 8 5.33 15 10.00 10  6.67 15 10.00 13 8.67   11
 
Further descriptive statistics on the variable are reported in table 4. We are aware that it is not 
entirely correct to compute means of ordinal variables. However, it allows to provide an insightful 
and synthetic representation of the data. 
 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics on firms’ degree of openness. 
DEGREE OF OPENNESS 




Finland 25  0 7 2.04  1  4 6 
Germany 9 0 1 0.11  0  0 1 
Italy  58  0 7 3.19  1  4 6 
Portugal 17  0 7 1.17  0  2 7 
Spain  41  0 7 2.56  2  6 7 
0.000 
Total  150  0 7  -  2  5 7   
Notes. Percentage intervals are coded as follows. 0%=0, >10%=1; 10%-30%=2; 31%-50%=3; 51%-70%=4; 71%-90%=5; 91%-
99%=6; 100%=7.  
 
4. The methodology of the econometric analysis 
4.1. The specification of the econometric model 
We investigate the determinants of degree of openness by software firms, thus testing the prediction 
of our theoretical model, through the estimate of an econometric model relating start-ups’ degree of 
openness to variables that reflect firm-specific characteristics (i.e. size and age), characteristics of 
the demand faced by the firms (i.e. customers’ sensitivity to price) of the products they offer (i.e. 
presence of network externalities), of the competitiveness of market segments on which companies 
operate. 
The dependent variable is the degree of openness that we label as DEGREE and is an ordinal 
variable, measured on a seven-point scale, ranging from 0 to 7. As a consequence, OLS 
assumptions turn out to be violated (Maddala 1983; Long 1997; Green 2000), making OLS 
procedures not suitable for the analysis, as they would lead to biased and inefficient estimations.  
Hence, we use an ordered Probit specification, which is the natural extension of Probit models when 
more than two alternatives are ordered. The ordered Probit model was developed by Aitchison and 
Silvey (1957) and Ashford (1959), and generalized to non-normal disturbances by Gurland et al. 
(1960).
10  
The objective of ordered Probit is to model ordered responses as functions of explanatory variables. 
Formally, let the ordered categorical outcome y be coded, without loss of generality, in a rank 
preserving manner, i.e. y E {1, 2 , . . . , J} where J denotes the total number of distinct categories. 
Furthermore, suppose that a (k x 1)-dimensional vector x of covariates is available. In standard 
ordered response models the cumulative probabilities of the discrete outcome are related to a single 
index of explanatory variables in the following way: 
Pr[y _< j|x] = F(kj - x'β)           j = 1 , . . . , J ; 
                                                 
10 However note that some authors have raised more than a concern on the use of the ordered latent specification in 
order to model a categorical monetary dependent variable proposing alternative methods (e.g. Stewart 1983, Stern 1991, 
Caudill and Jackson 1993, Bhat 1994). The implementation of these alternative methodologies in order to check the 
robustness of the findings that will be presented in the next section is high in our research agenda.   12
where kj and β(k+1) are unknown model parameters, and F can be any monotonic increasing function 
mapping the real line onto the unit interval. 
Although no further restrictions are imposed a priori on the transformation F it is standard to 
replace F by a distribution function, the most commonly used ones being the standard normal 
(which yields the ordered probit) and the logistic distribution (associated with the ordered logit 
model), and we assume in what follows that F represents the standard normal distribution. In order 
to ensure well-defined probabilities, we require that kj > kj-1, for every j, and it is understood that kj 
=  such that F() = 1 as well as k0 = -such that F(-) = 0. 
Ordered response models are usually motivated by an underlying continuous but latent process y* 
together with a response mechanism of the form 
y = j if and only if kj-1 ≤ y* = x’β +u < kj     j = l , . . . , J ; 
where k0 , . . . , kj are introduced as threshold parameters, discretizing the real line, represented by 
y*, into J categories. The latent variable y* is related linearly to observable and unobservable 
factors and the latter have a fully specified distribution function F(u) with zero mean and constant 
variance. 
As common in this typology of model, the framework can be postulated without assuming the 
existence of a latent part and a threshold mechanism, though. Moreover, since y* cannot be 
observed and is purely artificial, its interpretation is not of interest.  
 
4.2. The explanatory variables of the econometric models 
A summary of the explanatory variables used in the estimation of the econometric model is reported 
in table 5. They include variables related to the characteristics of the demand faced by the firms, of 
the software products firms choose to offer and of the competitiveness of the market segments in 
which firms compete.  




Determinants of the firms’ degree of openness   
EXTERNALITY 
3 point-Likert scale on the importance attached by customers to network externalities when choosing a software 
package  Positive 
PRICE  3 point-Likert scale on the importance attached by customers to price when choosing a software package  Negative 
ADVANTAGE 
Incumbent’s market share (C1 concentration ratio in percentage) in software product categories (Web server and 
related solutions, Protection systems, Web browser and Internet solutions on the client side, Content management 
systems, Database software; ERP, Office automation software)  Positive 
    
Control variables     
SIZE  Firm size as measured by the sum of working partners, employees, and freelance   
AGE  Firm age as measured by time elapsed since firm’s foundation as in 2004   
D_FIN  One for Finnish firms   
D_GER  One for German firms   
D_ITA  One for Italian firms   
D_SPAIN  One for Spanish firms   
 
As to product characteristics and the presence of network externalities, following Bonaccorsi et al. 
(2006), we measured customers’ sensitivity to network externalities referring to two variables on a 
5-point Likert scale. Firms were asked to give a score from 1 (not important at all) to 5 (very 
important) regarding to the importance attached by their customers to the availability of widely 
diffused packages (which is a proxy of direct network externalities) and of a large number of 
applications (which, in turn, is a proxy of indirect network externalities) when they choose a   13
software package. Since the two variables were found to be very collinear (linear coefficient= 
0.541), we derived a synthetic measure to be included in the analysis, which we label as 
EXTERNALITY. As most of the firms choose medium (3) or high values (4 and 5) for network 
externality variables, we decide to recode EXTERNALITY assigning to it value 1 if the firm 
chooses a score ranging from 1 to 3, value 2 if the chosen score was 4, and value 3 if the chosen 
score was 5.  
Actually, hypothesis H1 postulates a positive relation between customers’ sensitivity to network 
externalities and firms’ degree of openness. Hence, we predict a positive coefficient for 
EXTERNALITY. 
ADVANTAGE is a synthetic index accounting for the degree of the competition in the market 
segments in which start-ups are called to operate. The variable was constructed as follows. The 
ELISS questionnaire collected information on the categories of products offered by the respondents, 
both under proprietary and Open Source licenses. See table A2 of the Appendix for the list of these 
product categories. Then, product categories were grouped in seven macro-categories, defining 
market segments. Specifically, we identified the following seven well-distinct market segments: 
Web server and related solutions, Protection systems (i.e. antispam, antivirus), Web browser and 
Internet solutions on the client side, Content management systems, Database software; ERP, Office 
automation software.  
Triangulating data from multiple information sources (available upon request form the authors), we 
found out the market share of the incumbent firm in each market segment (corresponding to the C1 
concentration ratio), thus obtaining an estimation of competitive advantage of the incumbent. 
Incumbents’ market share are reported in table A3 of the Appendix. 
Using data on product offering by respondents, we constructed seven dummy variables (one for 
each market segment) assuming value 1 is the firm is active in that market segment and zero 
otherwise. Then, each dummy variable is multiplied by C1, in order to obtain a proxy of the 
disadvantage experienced by the firm in that market segment. Finally, the seven dummy variables 
were summed in order to obtain a synthetic measure of the structure of competition faced by the 
firm in the market segments in which it operates. Following the prediction of our theoretical model, 
we expect, a positive sign for the coefficient of ADVANTAGE, being the degree of openness 
positively related to the competitive advantage of the incumbent (hypothesis H2). 
Thirdly, PRICE is an ordinal variable assuming value 1 if, according to the firm, its customers 
attach a low important to price when choosing a software, value 2, if they attach a medium level of 
importance and 3 if they attach high importance to price. As far H3, we expect that PRICE has a 
negative effect on the degree of openness. 
Finally, we introduce in the econometric specification firm’s age and size as control variables. SIZE 
is the total staff of the firm, as measured by the number of working partners, employees, and 
freelances, while age is the age of the firm as measured by the time elapsed since firm’s foundation 
as in 2004 (the year of the survey). As these variables are controls, we leave to empirics the 
determination of their impact on firms’ degree of openness.  
Country dummies are also inserted for Finland (D_FIN), Germany (D_GER), Italy (D_ITA), and 
the Spain (D_SPAIN), while Portugal (D_PORT) represents the baseline for the estimation.  





   14
Table 6: Descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables of the econometric models 
Variable  Number of observations  Mean  S.D.  Min.  Max. 
Determinants of the firms' degree of openness      
EXTERNALITY 150  1.84  0.77  1  3 
ADVANTAGES 150  208.87  126.92  0  376 
PRICE 150  2.12  0.80  1  3 
        
Controls        
SIZE 150  27.37  112.36  1  1200 
AGE 150  2.75  1.26  0  4 
D_FIN 150  0.17  0.37  0  1 
D_GER 150  0.06  0.24  0  1 
D_ITA 150  0.39  0.49  0  1 
D_SPAIN 150  0.27  0.45  0  1 
D_PORT  150 0.11  0.32  0  1 
 
5. Results of the econometric analysis 
The results of the econometric analysis are illustrated in table 7. As explained in details in section 
4.1, in order to test our hypotheses we estimated an ordered Probit model.  
Let first focus attention on the effects of the variables of main interest. As expected, the coefficient 
of PRICE is positive and (albeit at 10% confidence level) significant, thus providing support to 
hypothesis H1 from our theoretical model, which postulates a positive relation between consumer 
sensitivity to price and firms’ degree of openness. This finding is also in line with the literature 
claiming that firms’ working with OS software can implement more efficient pricing policies due to 
the lowering on development costs made possible by the OS production mode. 
 
Table 7: The determinants of employee’s empowerment and project participation. Ordered Probit model. 
Variable Coefficient  S.E Significance. 
EXTERNALITY 0.229    0.128  * 
ADVANTAGES 0.004  0.001  *** 
PRICE -0.214  0.118  * 
      
Controls      
SIZE -0.007  0.004  * 
AGE -0.001  0.082   
D_FIN 0.650  0.387  * 
D_GER -0.747  0.688   
D_ITA 1.252  0.343  *** 
D_SPAIN 0.623  0.360  * 
      
Log likelihood  -246.839 
N° obs.  150 
Likelihood Ratio Test (Chi-square)  58.78 (9) 
Pseudo R
2  0.11 
     
      Notes. * p< .10; ** p< .05; *** p< .01. 
.  
The econometric findings provide clear evidence that the competitive advantage of the incumbents 
in market segments in which companies compete does play a clear role in increasing their degree of 
openness. ADVANTAGE has a positive coefficient, which is statistically significant at 1%   15
confidence level, thus providing(strong) support to H2. This represents a fairly insightful result, 
which is in line with the anecdotic evidence pointing to the fact that Open Source is a valuable 
alternative for small and medium enterprises wishing to enter market segments dominated by large 
proprietary companies.  
Our model provides also support to H3, as the coefficient of EXTERNALITY is found to 
significantly influence the degree of openness. Specifically, the higher importance attached by 
consumers to the availability of widely diffused packages and of complementary application, the 
higher the degree of openness chosen by the firm. This result mirrors that obtained by Casadesus-
Masanell and Ghemawat (2006) in modelling the Linux vs. Window competition. 
As far as control variables, we found a negative sign for AGE, which is in line with the literature 
claiming that degree of openness is inversely related to firms’ inertia, and then to their age. 
However, the coefficient is not significantly different from zero. The coefficient of SIZE is negative 
and slightly significant, pointing to the fact that SMEs might be more likely to adopt a business 
model highly oriented toward OSS. The coefficients of all the dummy variables but D_GER turn 
out to be significant, thus justifying their inclusion in the specification. 
 
6. Conclusions and further development of the research 
This work intends to establish some theoretical links between the degree of openness that start-ups 
firms choose and some of the main industrial characteristics faced by new entrants. More 
specifically, considering the software sector, a theoretical model is developed aiming at predicting 
the choice of the degree of openness by software start-up companies doing business out of OS 
depending on the characteristics of markets, products and consumers they deal with. Then, 
theoretical hypotheses are tested through the implementation of econometric techniques and 
information provided by a novel database (ELISS) obtained from a large-scale survey taken, in 
2004, on software firms in five European countries (Finland, Germany, Italy, Portugal, and Spain). 
Both theoretical predictions and empirical results suggest that the choice by start-ups of the degree 
of openness is negatively influenced by the characteristics of the demand faced by companies (i.e. 
the sensitivity of consumers to price), is positively related both to the strength of the network 
externalities that their software products exhibit and to the competitive advantage of the incumbent 
firm in the software market segments in which new companies operate. 
We think that this study considerably extends our understanding of the determinants of the degree 
of openness of software start-ups. In particular, it relates this choice both from a theoretical and an 
empirical point of view to consumers, product and market elements that rarely have been 
considered by previous research in the field.  However, we also are aware that it suffers from some 
limitations and its findings have to be regarded as highly preliminary. More specifically, the 
robustness of the empirical results needs further consideration through the implementation of 
alternative econometric techniques and a more appropriate operazionalization of the explanatory 
variables of main interest.  
In spite of all these limitations, we believe that the findings of this study provide an interesting 
contribution to the scientific debate on OS strategies. In particular, this study clearly indicates how  
a high degree of openness may represent a perfect rationale strategy for a profit maximising firm 
dealing with a given industrial environment. 
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APPENDIX 
Table A 1: Population (EUROSTAT 2003) and sample size distribution of firms in NACE code 72 
FINLAND GERMANY  ITALY 
POP.     SAMPLE     POP.     SAMPLE     POP.     SAMPLE     SIZE 
N %  N  % N %  N  % N %  N  % 
< 10  3805  89.19  71  52.59  37 314 88.52  17  18.28  79 326 94.38  202  83.13 
10-19  203  4.76  30  22.22 2  525  5.99  23  24.73 2  921  3.48  28  11.52 
20-49  142  3.33  17  12.59 1  478  3.51  26  27.96 1  160  1.38  11  4.53 
50-249  101  2.37 12 8.89  699  1.66 17  18.28  537  0.64  2  0.82 
≥250  15 0.35  5  3.70 138 0.33  10  10.75  106 0.13  0  0.00 
TOTAL  4 266  100.00  135  100.00  42 154 100.00  93  100.00  84 050 100.00  243  100.00 
 
Table A 1, continued 
PORTUGAL SPAIN  TOTAL 
POP.     SAMPLE     POP.     SAMPLE     POP.     SAMPLE    
N %  N  % N %  N  %  N  %  N  % 
2533  90.37 50 51.02  21  105  90.72 38 19.00  144  083  92.04  378  49.15 
130  4.64  31  31.63  1 086  4.67  60  30.00  6 865  4.39  172  22.37 
80 2.85  12  12.24  666 2.86  57  28.50  3  526 2.25  123  15.99 
52  1.86 4 4.08  313  1.35  30  15.00  1  702  1.09  65  8.45 
8  0.29 1 1.02  95  0.41  15  7.50  362  0.23  31  4.03 
2803  100.00  98  100.00  23 265  100.00  200  100.00  156 538  100.00  769  100.00 
 





1 Web  servers 
2  Other kinds of servers 




7  User and Identity Management 
8 E-mail  Client 
9 Instant  Messaging 
10 Web  Browser 
11  Digital Signature Systems 
12  Content Management System 
13 E-commerce  solutions 
14 E-learning  Tools 
15 Management  Software 
16  Data Management Software 
17 Workflow  Systems 
18  Office Automation Packages 
   19
 
Table A 3: Market segments and market share of the incumbent firm in each segment 
Market Segment  Acronym  Market share of the incumbent firm 
Web server and related solutions  WS  23.73 
Protection systems  PS  54.20 
Web browser and related services  WB  91.27 
Content management system  CMS  23.00 
Database software  DB  46.80 
EPR  EPR  42.00 
Office automation software  OA  95.00 
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